Australia’s military tactics and operations were shaped in Australia’s New Guinea campaigns of 1942–1945. They marked the beginning of a direct and major strategic and political involvement with Australia’s northern archipelago neighbours. The models for Australian doctrine on amphibious warfare, air-land cooperation and jungle fighting came from The Papuan campaign. Australians first learned military strategy and operations in Papua New Guinea.
The Papuan campaign, between July 1942 and January 1943, was conducted primarily as a reaction to Japanese initiatives. One of the most significant events in the campaigns was Australia’s involvement in the Kokoda Trail. The Australians formulated the warfare strategy of jungle warfare, which was methodically developed, as an unconventional, low-intensity, guerilla-style of warfare.
During WWII, vast arrays of tanks, aircraft and artillery supported the infantryman in Europe and Africa. Few large-scale weapons were available in Papua New Guinea hence the traditional tactics of infantry fighting built upon fire and movement were not heavily utilised.
Because of the jungle environment in which the Australians fought, visibility was poor. Usually from 10 to 15 metres, fog and rain would interfere with typical warfare tactics the Australians had originally employed. This proved to be a challenge, as Australian soldiers were in unknown tactical territory, as many soldiers suffered from malaria and dysentery.
Another challenge Australian soldiers faced in the jungles was communication. Steep slopes, few tracks, thick jungle and deep treacherous streams hindered the ability to make and receive orders immensely. Typically the company commander could see few of his own men and his subordinates, the platoon commanders, were often unsure where they were in relation to their own superior, other platoons and sometimes even their own sections. Conditions were very like night fighting.
All these reasons culminated in the typical tactical experience of the Australian soldier on the Kokoda track. However, they learned to adapt to their new conditions, this was when they began to utilise jungle warfare. They fought in a section divided into two small groups, a six-man rifle group or a four-man gun group. After locating the enemy the gun group brings fire to bear on them while, under cover of the fire, the rifle group crawls closer lobbing grenades into the enemy's fighting pit. Suddenly another enemy opens up and the whole movement halts while the problem is reassessed. The platoon leader commits another of his sections to tackle the new threat. Slowly, usually by crawling and using every scrap of cover, and with long periods where no one can see the enemy and the enemy cannot see them, the attack proceeds. Despite the rapid firings, section commanders would direct fire to the area where they believe the enemy is. Eventually enemies are annihilated and a gap in the enemy defences is made. Taking advantage of this the attackers would continue edging forward and gradually kill the defenders or force them back. Such engagements required much patience and skill. Quite often soldiers would see no live enemy during an engagement.
1942 - In Papua New Guinea, men of the 2/14th Infantry Battalion
25 December 1942 - An Australian soldier, George "Dick" Whittington, is aided by Papuan orderly Raphael Oimbari, at the Battle of Buna-Gona. Whittington died in February 1943 from the effects of bush typhus, this little-known killer of many Allied and Japanese soldiers in the Pacific.
This poem was written by Australian Digger Bert Beros and recounts the prayers of worried Australian mothers, whose young sons are fighting the Japanese on that rugged trail, and how their prayers are answered in the form of ‘fuzzy wuzzy angels’. It also represents the ongoing friendship between Australia and Papua New Guinea.
Fuzzy Wuzzy Angels Many a mother in Australia when the busy day is done Sends a prayer to the Almighty for the keeping of her son Asking that an angel guide him and bring him safely back Now we see those prayers are answered on the Owen Stanley Track. For they haven't any halos only holes slashed in their ears And their faces worked by tattoos with scratch pins in their hair Bringing back the badly wounded just as steady as a horse Using leaves to keep the rain off and as gentle as a nurse Slow and careful in the bad places on the awful mountain track They look upon their faces would make you think Christ was black Not a move to hurt the wounded as they treat him like a saint It's a picture worth recording that an artist's yet to paint Many a lad will see his mother and husbands see their wives Just because the fuzzy wuzzy carried them to save their lives From mortar bombs and machine gun fire or chance surprise attacks To the safety and the care of doctors at the bottom of the track May the mothers of Australia when they offer up a prayer Mention those impromptu angels with their fuzzy wuzzy hair. - Bert Beros
1942 - Japanese troops
Japanese Strategy:
Japan’s military tactics in the Papuan campaign from December 1941 to mid-1942 was an aggressive one. Their objective was to advance and occupy locations of strategic importance, either resource rich areas, or suitable areas the the defence of their gains. The Allied strategy in the same period was defensive, in order to prevent the Japanese achieving their strategic goals.
As the Kokoda fighting began in July 1942 the strategy of both sides was in development. The Japanese felt that they had been too hasty in their advance so they decided to instead defend their gains. The Allies were thinking the opposite. Having massed troops, ships, aircraft and supplies in Australia and New Zealand, they decided to launch a counterattack to retake some of the islands now occupied by the Japanese.
The Japanese had attacked to obtain the rubber of Malaya, the oil of Borneo and the quinine of Java, but there was no particular resource in Papua that they desired. Rather, Papua New Guinea would become a useful link to the chain of defences of the newly conquered area. The Allies were aware and had built up their strength in Australia, assuming this would be directed northwards towards the major Japanese naval base of Rabaul, the Japanese required a screen of air bases forward of Rabaul for protection. The Allies wanted these same air bases in Papua New Guinea to support their attack on Rabaul: Port Moresby, Milne Bay, Kokoda and Buna. These four locations were of continuing strategic interest for both sides and so became the focus of most of the land, sea and air fighting in the Papuan campaign.
According to a U.S Army Colonel, Japanese tactics in Kokoda involved a trained advance guard who lead their column, with the aim of eliminating Australian defence with machine-gun and mortar fire. Then, if various feints and demonstrations by opening a premature fire did not give away the Australian soldier’s position, the Japanese would try to infiltrate around the flanks. There were many cases where, when the advance elements were allowed to sneak by, the supports which followed them could be ripped up by machine-gun and rifle fire. However, if the defense disclosed its position by too early or too powerful a fire, the Japanese brought up machine guns and mortars and blasted their opposition’s lines.
To test the possibility of further advance, the Japanese used many tricks based on two natural human traits - fear of the unseen and unknown, and curiosity. They appeared to place much confidence in the effect of noise, and for this reason did considerable firing, both to bolster their own courage and to lower Australian morale. Captured weapons were shot off to give the impression that our men were firing them; they fired machine guns out on the flank to give the impression that our position was being turned; or they talked loudly and shook bushes to draw nervous shots or cause movement. In order to distract attention and cause confusion, they exploded firecrackers.
In their attack on prepared positions, the Japanese used a standard procedure. By reconnaissance and ruses, they tried to determine Australian strength and location. They searched for weak spots in the Australian defence, and persisted in attacking there. Should the first attack fail, attention was shifted, but the Japanese generally returned to the original point of attack.
Often, in this phase of the fighting, the Japanese used no preparatory fire. After contact was made, their skirmish line hit the ground while overhead fire by machine guns and mortars fell on Australian positions. Under cover of the barrage, supports would try to crawl close enough to put down a hand-grenade barrage to protect the advance. It was not uncommon during such attacks for the Japanese to replace forward troops. This change-over was accomplished efficiently military. Incidentally, the Japanese would advance under a white flag and shoot at anyone coming out, disguise himself as a native, and in retreat, litter the trail with cast-off garments and equipment to give the impression of a disorderly flight, and then ambush the pursuit. This procedure was a motif in Japan’s military tactics on the Kokoda trail.